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CREDITORS' RIGHTS ISSUES IN COPYRIGHT LAW: 
CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION* 
Charles Shafert 
Although preferring voluntary payment from debtors, creditors 
must often compel the sale of debtors' property to satisfy debts. 
Ordinarily, state law controls the acquisition of a judgment or a 
security interest, and federal law controls when there is a federal 
tax lien or a bankruptcy proceeding. However, if the debtor's 
property to be sold is a copyright, ooth federal and state credi-
tors' law must be reconciled with federal copyright law. The au-
thor briefly reviews recent devefopments in both creditors' and 
copyright law, discusses areas in which creditors' rights law and 
the Copyright Act conflict, and suggests resolution of these con-
flicts by considering the underlying rationale of the taws, empha-
sizing the Copyright Act's purpose of providing authors with a 
sujJicient monopoly to encourage creativity. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The drafters of the United States Constitution, recognizing the sig-
nificance of creativity, granted to Congress the power to give "Authors" 
exclusive rights in their "writings.") The drafters also recognized that 
only a monopoly sufficient to encourage socially useful creativity was 
necessary and therefore provided that the exclusive rights should exist 
for only a "Limited Time."2 Pursuant to this constitutional grant, Con-
gress enacted a copyright statute, the current version of which gives 
creators not only exclusive rights in their works but also the power to 
sell those rights.3 As a property right which the author may sell, a 
copyright is also a right which creditors of the owner should be able to 
use in satisfaction of the owner's debts.4 
* Copyright, 1982 by Charles Shafer, Baltimore, Maryland. 
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1. U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The term "author" includes artists, composers, cho-
reographers, and other creators. The term "writings" includes records, films, 
paintings, statues, and other works. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. 
§ 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980). In this article, any reference to "author" includes all 
creators of copyrightable works. 
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
3. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 201(d) (Supp. IV 1980). The copyright statute 
has been periodically revised since originally enacted by the first Congress. Prior 
to the 1976 Act, the most recent thorough revision had been in 1909. H.R. REP. 
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5659, 5738-39 [hereinafter cited as House Report with page citations to 
[1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS]. 
4. The fact that a copyright may be seized makes it of more, not less, value to the 
owner. The availability of the copyright as an asset increases the net worth of the 
owner, to which creditors look when deciding whether to extend credit, even if 
unsecured. 
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Issues involving creditors' use of copyrights have surfaced in few 
recorded cases.5 Perhaps one reason for this dearth of cases is that the 
value of literary and artistic property has only recently been great 
enough to warrant widespread use of copyrights to satisfy debts or to 
resort to litigation.6 It is more likely that conceptual and procedural 
difficulties arising from the conflicting federal and state statutes have 
limited the apparent usefulness of copyright to creditors. 
Creditors' rights and responsibilities are governed by a variety of 
federal and state statutes. When a creditor procures an agreement from 
a debtor allowing the creditor to keep or sell named property upon the 
debtor's default, the creditor is secured and his 7 rights and obligations, 
as well as priorities between creditors, are controlled by state Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) provisions.8 When a judgment creditor9 
seeks satisfaction by sale of the debtor's property, his duties and the 
procedures for such sale are ruled by other state statutory provisions. 10 
In cases involving the federal government as a creditor, federal statutes 
such as the Tax Lien Act ll mandate still other procedures upon de-
fault l2 and often afford the government a higher priority as to the 
5. The only reported cases which deal with creditors' attempts to satisfy obligations 
by the sale of copyrights are the following: Stephens v. Cady, 55 V.S. (14 How.) 
528 (1852) (execution sale of engraving did not pass title to copyright); Platt & 
Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963) (local lien law 
notwithstanding, unpaid manufacturer of copyrighted goods may not sell those 
goods without court determination that failure to pay was unjustified); Republic 
Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952) (state 
courts have jurisdiction over copyright foreclosure); In re Leslie-Judge Co., 272 F. 
886 (2d Cir.) (copyrights can only be mortgaged under federal law), cerl. denied 
sub nom. Green v. Felder, 256 U.S. 704 (1921); Kingsrow Enterprises, Inc. v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (sheriff's sale of films does not 
constitute sale of copyrights); Independent Film Distribs., Ltd. v. Chesapeake 
Ind., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (court questions but does not resolve 
potential conflict between state created lien on motion pictures and Copyright 
Act), rev'd on other grounds, 250 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1958); In re P.H. McBride & 
Co., 132 F. 285 (S.D. N.Y. 1904) (court deals with assignability of copyright by 
bankruptcy trustee). 
6. See Note, Transfers of Copyrights for Security Under the New Copyright Act, 88 
YALE L.J. 125, 125 nn.2 & 4 (1978). 
7. The use of any gender in this article shall include the other gender, whenever 
appropriate. 
S. The VCC, prepared by the American Law Institute and the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has gone through a number of revi-
sions, the most significant being the revisions of Article Nine in 1972 and Article 
Eight in 1977, with conforming amendments throughout the Code. This last revi-
sion is referred to as the 1978 Official Text. 
9. A judgment creditor is "one who has obtained a judgment against his debtor, 
under which he can enforce execution." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 980-81 (4th 
ed. 1968). 
10. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-401 to -503 (1980 & Supp. 
1982); MD. R.P. 619-628, Fl to G61. 
11. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6326 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
12. Id § 6322 (1976). 
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debtor's property. 13 Finally, if the debtor seeks relief under the bank-
ruptcy laws, the formalities and priorities relevant to use of the debtor's 
property to satisfy obligations are governed by the federal Bankruptcy 
Act. 14 In any of these situations, if the property to be sold is a copy-
right, compliance with the federal Copyri~ht Act's provisions regulat-
ing the transfer of copyright ownership I may be mandated. Since 
copyright law and creditors' rights law have developed independently 
and serve different purposes, it is difficult to reconcile the resulting con-
flicting provisions. 
This article reviews recent developments in both creditors' and 
copyright law, cites and examines many of the conflicting statutory pro-
visions, and discusses the problems presented by these conflicts. The 
author suggests resolution of these conflicts by emphasizing the under-
lying constitutional purpose of copyright legislation: providing authors 
with a sufficient monopoly to encourage creativity. 
II. BACKGROUND: RECENT STATUTORY 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Much of what has been written on this topic predates significant 
changes in the law. 16 Three major components of the relevant law have 
undergone complete statutory revisionY First, the rights of secured 
creditors are now governed by Article Nine of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (hereinafter referred to as Article Nine),18 a statute which has 
been in effect in most states for only about twenty years. 19 Prior to its 
13. Id § 6323. 
14. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II V.S.c. §§ 101-1160 (Supp. IV 1980). 
15. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. §§ 201-205 (Supp. IV 1980). 
16. The scholarly literature on the subject consists of the following: I G. GILMORE, 
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 410-16, 542-46 (1965); Bramson, 
Intellectual Property as Collateral-Patents, Trade Secrets, Trademarks and Copy-
rights, 36 Bus. LAW. 1567 (1981); Concoif, Motion Picture Secured Transactions 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Problems in Peifection, 13 V.c.L.A. L. 
REV. 1214 (1966); Ditto, Musical Copyright as Collateral in Secured Transactions, 
19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 219 (1971); Freeman, The Copyright asa Secur-
ity, 12 J.B.A. KANSAS 257 (1944); Kaplan, Literary and Artistic Property (Including 
Copyright) as Security: Problems Facing the Lender, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
254 (1954); Note, Copyright as Collateral in a Secured Transaction, 39 ST. JOHN'S 
L. REV. 90 (1964); Note, Creditors' Rights Against Interests in Patents and Copy-
rights, 26 VA. L. REV. 1038 (1940); Note, Transfers of Copyrights for Security 
Under the New Copyright Act, 88 YALE L.J. 125 (1978). 
17. Only one component, state law concerning the rights of unsecured creditors, con-
tinues to change at a glacial pace. However, these changes, to the extent they are 
intelligible, tend to lessen the obstacles a creditor must face in using a copyright to 
satisfy a judgment. See text accompanying notes 113-33 infra. 
18. In 1972, thirty-five states adopted revisions of Article Nine. VNIF. COMMERCIAL 
CODE, I V.L.A. I (Supp. 1982). Many states have adopted non-uniform provi-
sions. For a compilation, see the state correlation tables, V.c.c. Rep. Servo (Cal-
laghan) (Supp. 1982). 
19. Prior to 1960, only Pennsylvania and Massachusetts had adopted the VCc. By 
1968, all states except Louisiana had adopted the Code. Louisiana adopted Arti-
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enactment it was questionable whether a copyright was susceptible to a 
security interest, which of the forms of security interests would be ap-
propriate, and what method of perfection was appropriate. To further 
complicate the problem, the result varied from state to state. Now, 
however, under Article Nine, a copyright is classified as a "general in-
tangible" which may be the subject of a security interest.2o Regardless 
of what a transaction was termed prior to the adoption of Article Nine, 
the term "security interest" now applies to all transactions in which 
personal property secures an obligation,21 and filing an Article Nine 
financing statement perfects a security interest in all general in-
tangibles. 22 Article Nine is virtually uniform nationallaw.23 
The second revision involved the passage of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978.24 The substantive law of bankruptcy which relates to 
copyrights changed very little. A copyright can be property of the 
bankruptcy estate which the trustee may sell in liquidating the estate to 
satisfy creditors.25 
Finally, copyrights themselves have been the subject of a thorough 
statutory revision. The Copyright Act of 1976, which went into effect 
on January 1, 1978, is the first revision of the federal copyright laws in 
seventy years?6 Significant in the area of creditors' rights are the as-
pects of the new law relating to the creation and transfer of copyrights. 
Under the previous version of the Copyright Act, federal copyright 
protection usually began with the "publication" of a work.27 Before 
publication, an author often had state law protection, which was called 
common law copyright.28 The new Copyright Act has virtually elimi-
nated common law copyrights. Now every author has a federally pro-
tected copyright in a work as soon as it is "fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression."29 An author need not register or obtain any 
certification in order to obtain a copyright in a work. For example, 
although the author has no federally protected copyright in thoughts 
cles One, Three, Four and Five in 1975, UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, I U.L.A. 1 
(1976), and Articles Seven and Eight in 1978. fd (Supp. 1982). 
20. U.c.c. § 9-lO6. Issues involving copyrights must be distinguished from assign-
ments of payments due for the sale of copyrights. Such an assignment would be 
of a general intangible, but state law regarding assignments would govern rather 
than the Copyright Act. 
21. fd § 9-102 comment 1. 
22. fd § 9-302. 
23. See note 18 supra. 
24. 11 U.S.C. §§ lOl-1160 (Supp. IV 1980). 
25. See text accompanying notes 171-81 iTifra. 
26. See House Report, supra note 3, at 5660. 
27. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.c. §§ lO, 24 (1976) (repealed 1976). Publication 
was generally defined as distribution of copies of a work to the public. fd § 26. 
28. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02, at 2-16-17 (1982). The term is 
misleading in that some states also had statutes governing "common law" copy-
rights. Absent a statute, however, case law often served to protect an author's 
unpublished work. fd 
29. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § lO2(a) (Supp. IV 1980). 
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told to a friend, he does have a copyright when those thoughts are 
placed on paper. However, the author must place a copyright notice on 
the work if it is published. This notice consists of the word "copyright" 
or the symbol C, the year of the publication, and the name of the copy-
right owner.30 If a work is published without such a notice, the work 
may be considered to be in the public domain, which means it has no 
copyright protection.31 A copyright can be registered in the Copyright 
Office by depositing the work and completing an application.32 Al-
though registration is not necessary for a work to have copyright pro-
tection, it is necessary to record ownership transfers and to obtain relief 
for infringements.33 
The revisions regarding transfers of copyrights are particularly sig-
nificant in the area of creditors' rights. Under the old Copyright Act 
there was some question as to the legitimacy of an author's selling only 
some of the rights secured by a copyright.34 The new Act explicitly 
provides that an author may sell one or more of the rights secured by a 
copyright and reserve to himself other rights. 35 Therefore, the author 
may grant to a publisher the rights to produce and sell a book and may 
grant to a studio the right to produce a movie based on that book. 
The grant of a security interest is explicitly included within the 
term "transfer of copyright ownership" as used in the Copyright Act. 36 
All such ownership transfers can be recorded in the Copyright Office.3? 
That recordation gives all persons constructive notice of the transfer 
only if the document "specifically identifies the work ... [and] regis-
tration has been made for the work."38 Hence recordation is ineffective 
if the work is unregistered. 
The statute continues to have one priority provision to resolve dis-
putes between conflicting transferees. The old Copyright Act essen-
tially provided that if a transfer was not recorded within three months 
of execution, it would be subordinate to a later good faith transfer 
which was duly recorded.39 The new Act provides: 
30. Id § 401. 
31. Id §§ 401,405. 
32. Id § 408(a). 
33. Id §§ 205(c), 411, 412. 
34. See House Report, supra note 3, at 5738-39. 
35. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 106 (Supp. IV 1980). 
36. Actually, the copyright statute defines a transfer to include a "mortgage" or "hy-
pothecation." Id § 101. It is puzzling that the statute does not use the one term 
by which Article Nine designates all such transactions, to wit, "security interests." 
37. Id § 205(a). 
38. Id § 205(c). 
39. The old Act provided that 
[e]very assignment of copyright shall be recorded in the copyright office 
within three calendar months after its execution in the United States or 
within six calendar months after its execution without the limits of the 
United States, in default of which it shall be void as against any subse-
quent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without no-
tice, whose assignment has been duly recorded. 
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As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first 
prevails if it is recorded, in the manner required to give con-
structive notice . . . at any time before recordation in such 
manner of the later transfer. Otherwise the later transfer 
prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if taken in good 
faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of a binding 
promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier 
transfer.40 
411 
Two provisions of the new Copyright Act which provide protec-
tion to authors and may have significant implications in the creditors' 
rights area are a nonwaivable right of termination41 and a prohibition 
of certain involuntary transfers.42 The new right to terminate transfers 
essentially allows an author to terminate or revoke a transfer of rights 
thirty-five to forty years after the original grant was executed.43 The 
author must give at least two years, and no more than ten years, notice 
of his intention to terminate the grant.44 The Act prevents waiver of 
this right.45 The rationale is that the author is in an unfair bargaining 
position since he cannot predict the value that a work will have many 
years in the future. 46 Therefore, he should not be allowed to sell those 
future rights. 
The right of termination is a substitute for the old Act's renewal 
provision, under which a copyright had a duration of twenty-eight 
years with a right of renewal.47 An author who sold rights in a work 
actually sold those rights for only twenty-eight years. This led to the 
practice of selling the right of renewal along with the copyright, and 
courts recognized the validity of the sale of the renewal right.48 Since 
the right of termination is now nonwaivable, that right should not suf-
fer the same fate as the right of renewal. 
The second innovation in the Copyright Act is the provision 
preventing involuntary transfers.49 This provision prevents copyrights 
from being seized by governmental units: 
When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of 
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previ-
ously been transferred voluntarily by that individual author, 
no action by any governmental body or other official organi-
Copyright Act of 1909, 17 V.S.c. § 30 (1976) (repealed 1976). 
40. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. § 205(e) (Supp. IV 1980). 
41. ld § 203(a)(5). 
42. ld § 201(e). 
43. ld § 203(a)(3). 
44. ld § 203(a)(4). 
45. ld § 203(a)(5). "Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any 
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any 
future grant." ld 
46. See House Report, supra note 3, at 5740. 
47. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 V.S.c. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1976). 
48. Eg., Fisher Music v. Witmark & Sons, 318 V.S. 643 (1943). 
49. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. § 201(e) (Supp. IV 1980). 
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zation purportin& to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise 
rights of ownershIp with respect to the copyright, or any of the 
exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect 
50 
The purpose of the section is to prevent governments from silencing 
dissidents by seizing the copyrights to their works.5 I The drafters of the 
section were particularly concerned with possible action by Communist 
governments. Arguably, if a government seized the copyright, the gov-
ernment could then rely on the International Copyright Convention to 
prevent dissemination of the work in other countries. It has been 
pointed out that this statutory remedy was unnecessary for the feared 
evip2 As written, the provision may have serious implications in the 
area of creditors' rights since seizure of a copyright by any government 
official to satisfy a debt may be precluded. 53 
Although this ends the discussion of the Copyright Act provisions 
which are most significant to creditors, there is one relevant aspect of 
copyright law which is not present in the statute. This concept is droit 
mora/., moral right. The civil law countries provide a cause of action 
for violation of an author's droit mora! to obtain redress for deforma-
tion of the artist's work.54 The law recognizes that an artist may have a 
continuing interest in the presentation of his work despite his surrender 
of all economic interest in the work. American courts have not explic-
itly recognized a moral right.55 However, courts have found a variety 
of conventional theories which can be used to vindicate that right. For 
example, a contractual retention of control could be implied into the 
copyright grant.56 A distorted presentation of the author's work could 
be classified as a misrepresentation to the audience on which the author 
is financially dependent. Also, when a work is distorted but still pub-
lished under the original author's name, courts can find a misstatement 
of source;57 redress for such misstatement may be had under section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act,58 the federal unfair competition law. 
In the area of creditors' rights, the implications of the moral right 
concept are important. This concept highlights the difference between 
50. Id 
51. See House Report, supra note 3, at 5739. 
52. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.04, at 10-41 (1982). 
53. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra. 
54. Maslow, Droit Moral and Sections 4](a) and 44(i) if the Lanham ACI-A Judicial 
Shell Game?, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 377,379 (1980). 
55.ld at 377. But see Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14,23-24 (2d Cir. 1976) (recognizing 
that courts have granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist's work based on 
theories outside the statutory law of copyright). 
56: See, e.g., GiIIiam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14,21 (2d Cir. 1976) (agreement interpreted as 
reserving to author the authority to prevent revisions of work); Granz v. Harris, 
198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (contractual duty to attribute work implies duty not to 
distort work). 
57. See, e.g., GiIIiam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976). 
58. 15 U.S.c. § 1125(a) (1976). 
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a copyright and other types of property, such as a carload of steel coils. 
Both are property which can be used to satisfy debts. Surely the manu-
facturer of the coils would be saddened to see them seized, but presum-
ably he has no continuing interest in what happens to them. The 
author or artist may see his work as an extension of himself and may 
feel as strongly as a parent feels about a child regarding the treatment 
of the work. Second, although the Copyright Act does not recognize 
the moral right, the fact that courts find ways to give expression to the 
moral right may influence the result reached where copyright law is 
ambiguous. Having reviewed the recent developments in creditors' 
law, as well as specific Copyright Act provisions and concepts, it is im-
portant to address specific conflicting provisions with regard to secured, 
unsecured, and government creditors. 
III. SECURITY INTERESTS IN COPYRIGHTS 
A. Slale-Federal COIif/iclS 
Since problems involving secured transactions and copyrights are 
controlled by two comprehensive statutes, both of which were recently 
enacted, it is surprising that there is much confusion in the interplay of 
these federal and state laws. It appears, however, that the drafters of the 
Copyright Act gave little thought to security interests and that the 
drafters of Article Nine gave little thought to copyrights. 
As this conflict involves federal and state legislation, it is impor-
tant to consider the federal preemption doctrine, which requires that 
when Congress has legislated pursuant to a constitutional grant, state 
law may not controvert federallaw.59 If, however, the federal statute 
does not resolve a particular issue, it may be permissible to resort to 
state law. State law can have effect only if the constitutional grant to 
Congress does not preclude any state legislation.60 Copyright is such 
an area.61 However, any state law which does deal with copyright is-
sues cannot stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."62 This issue was ad-
dressed in a case in which a state law prevented "blind booking" of film 
rights by film distributors.63 Blind booking requires theatre owners to 
commit themselves to the showing of films before actually seeing them 
and, therefore, affects profits earned. Since profitable distribution of 
59. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954). 
60. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973). The Court cited The Federalist 
for the three instances in which the constitutional grant to the federal government 
is deemed exclusive: (I) the Constitution expressly states that the grant is exclu-
sive; (2) the Constitution expressly limits state authority; and (3) state law would 
be inherently contradictory of any national law. Id at 552-53 (citing THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 42, at 305 (B. Wright ed. 1961)). 
61. Id at 559. 
62. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), cited with approval in Goldstein v. 
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
63. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630 (S.D. Ohio 1980). 
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films is also made possible by copyright protection, it was argued that 
the state law which impeded such distribution interfered with the 
Copyright Act.64 The court, however, determined that the state statute 
did not undermine any congressional purpose and, therefore, upheld 
the law.65 
The preemption doctrine is explicitly incorporated into the Copy-
right Act by section 301 which preempts any state law which both deals 
with subject matter within the scope of the Act and provides rights 
equivalent to copyright.66 The preemption doctrine is also included in 
Article Nine which expressly provides that it does not apply "to a se-
curity interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent 
that such statute governs rights of parties to and third parties affected 
by transactions in particular types of properties. "67 This provision adds 
nothing to the law since, even without it, state law could not conflict 
with federal law regarding federally created rights.68 The difficult 
question, however, is determining the extent to which state law may be 
resorted to in resolving particular issues when copyright law is ambigu-
ous or nonexistent. 
Security interest problems usually involve two issues: enforceabil-
ity, whether the secured party obtains rights in the property against the 
debtor; and perfection, whether the secured party has rights against 
third parties such as purchasers of the collateral or other secured par-
ties. Both the Copyright Act and Article Nine have provisions relating 
to those two issues.69 
B. Obtaining a Security Interest 
As indicated earlier, the provisions in the Copyright Act governing 
a transfer of ownership also govern a grant of a security intereseo 
Ownership of a copyright may be transferred by "any means of convey-
ance"71 but is not valid unless "an instrument of conveyance, or a note 
or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the own-
er.'>72 The requirement of a writing appears also in Article Nine.73 
The required writing, however, is a "security agreement" defined as a 
document "which creates or provides for a security interest."74 There is 
64. Id at 655. 
65. Id at 650-51. 
66. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. § 301(a) (Supp. IV 1980). 
67. V.C.c. § 9-104(a). 
68. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 V.S. 52 (1941). 
69. Copyright Act of 1976,17 V.S.c. §§ 201-204 (Supp. IV 1980) (transfers of owner-
ship); id § 205 (recordation and priorities); V.c.c. §§ 9-201 to -204 (enforceabil-
ity); id §§ 9-301 to -318 (perfection and priorities). 
70. See note 36 and accompanying text supra. 
71. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. § 201(d) (Supp. IV 1980). 
72. Id § 204(a). 
73. V.c.c. § 9-203(1)(a). 
74. Id § 9-105(1)(1). 
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some dispute as to whether a security agreement must contain a grant-
ing clause which explicitly creates the security interest. 75 If Article 
Nine is interpreted as necessitating such a clause, then the state law 
requirements for the creation of a security interest are stricter than the 
Copyright Act's transfer provision requiring merely a memorandum.76 
One writer has interpreted the Copyright Act's reference to a memo-
randum to mean that even a subsequent confirmation in writing of a 
prior oral agreement validates the grant ab initio. 77 
It could be argued that the Article Nine rules cannot prevail since 
they conflict with the Copyright Act. Congress has explicitly provided 
a more lenient memorandum requirement. In fact, the requirement ap-
pears to be significantly more lenient than the old Copyright Act which 
required "an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor."78 Opting 
for the Article Nine requirement would produce the apparently anoma-
lous result that the procedure for sale of a copyright is simpler than for 
creating a security interest. However, the language of the Copyright 
Act does support an argument that it sets forth only the minimum re-
quirements and that states may impose additional requirements for 
particular types of transfers.79 
The most convincing argument to resolve this dispute is that impo-
sition of the state requirements does not conflict with the congressional 
purpose of creating a valuable property right for authors. The state law 
does not dilute the value of the copyright and thereby discourage crea-
tivity; instead, it protects the copyright owner. Lending parties aware 
of the Article Nine requirements in advance can, with no additional 
cost, comply with them. The apparent anomaly is explained by the fact 
that a sale usually accompanies greater evidence of intent since the 
buyer begins to use the copyright immediately, whereas a lender takes 
no visible action until foreclosure. Therefore, it is reasonable to re-
quire better documentation for the grant of a security interest. 
One additional Article Nine requirement not found in the Copy-
75. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-3, at 904-10 
(2d ed. 1980). 
76. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 204(a) (Supp. IV 1980). 
77. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1O.03[A], at 10-34 (1982). 
78. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.c. § 28 (1976) (repealed 1976). But see Khan v. 
Leo Feist, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 450 (S.D. N.Y.), affd, 105 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(written assignment of copyright deemed to relate back to time of parol assign-
ment two years earlier). 
79. Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides that "a transfer ... is not 
valid unless . ... " (emphasis added). It might be argued that if Congress had 
intended to prevent additional state imposed requirements, the statute would have 
read "a transfer is valid!/,' and, therefore, it merely sets forth minimum require-
ments as written. Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history indicating a 
desire to provide a more lenient requirement for copyright security interest docu-
mentation than state law requires for other property. In fact, the language that a 
copyright may be transferred by "any means of conveyance" implies that state law 
means of conveyance are applicable and that the transfer, therefore, would have 
to comply with state law. 
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right Act is that value must be given to create a security interest.8o 
Since the definition of "value" is so sweeping,81 it is difficult to conceive 
of a security interest transaction that would not involve the giving of 
value. This requirement is more significant for dating attachment of a 
security interest for purposes of priority. 82 
C Peifection of Security Interests 
Both the Copyright Act and Article Nine provide a system of rec-
ordation of ownership transfers to give notice to third parties. When 
that transfer is a security interest, normally the Article Nine recorda-
tion system applies. With copyrights, however, the preemption doc-
trine would obviate resort to a state filing system if use of such system 
contravenes the Copyright Act. Article Nine itself has a provision 
which specifically incorporates that doctrine with regard to recordation 
req uirements. 83 
Under the old Copyright Act, there was no problem because secur-
ity interests in copyrights were subject to federal recordation even ab-
sent a prior copyright registration.84 Under the present Copyright Act, 
use of the Copyright Act filing system is not always available or appro-
priate. There may be no copyright registration, an absolute prerequi-
site for a filing to be effective.85 One instance involves a book or movie 
prepared in stages.86 Each copyright registration of such a work covers 
only the portions prepared at the time the copyright is registered. If an 
80. v.c.c. § 9-203(1)(b). The value requirement previously appeared as § 9-204 of 
the 1962 edition of the VCc. 
81. The VCC provides that "a person gives 'value' for rights if he acquires them (a) in 
return for a binding commitment to extend credit ... (b) as security for ... 
satisfaction of a pre-existing claim ... (c) by accepting delivery ... [of] a pre-
existing ... purchase; or (d) ... in return for any consideration .... " U.c.c. 
§ 1-201(44). 
82. In the Copyright Act of 1976, § 205(e) dates priority from the time the transfer is 
"executed." 17 V.S.c. § 205(e) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 204 is titled "execution" 
but it only states that a tran~fer is not valid without a writing. Id § 204. It has 
also been demonstrated that a subsequent memorandum will suffice as a writing. 
The date of execution would not, therefore, necessarily be the date of the writing. 
If, for purposes of a security interest, execution occurs when the security interest 
becomes enforceable, it would not occur until value is given. For purposes of 
§ 205(e), priority would date from the time value is given. 
83. V.c.c. § 9-302(3). 
84. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 V.S.c. § 30 (1976) (repealed 1976). Even though § 30 
refers only to assignments, any doubt regarding the availability of Copyright Of-
fice recording for security interests appears to be settled by regulations providing 
for recordation of mortgages. Bramson, Intellectual Property as Collateral- Pat-
ents, Trade Secrets, Trademarks and Copyrights, 36 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1580-81 
(1981). 
85. The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that documents must be recorded "in the 
manner required to give constructive notice." 17 U.S.c. § 205(e) (Supp. IV 1980). 
The Act also provides that the work must be registered in order for a filing to give 
constructive notice. Id § 205(c). 
86. The practices of the movie industry are discussed in Note, Transfers o.f Copyrights 
for Security Under the New Copyright Act, 88 YALE L.J. 125, 128-29 (1978). 
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author completes five chapters of a book and has that portion regis-
tered, a subsequently completed sixth chapter would not be covered by 
the registration. If the sixth chapter were not registered, a security in-
terest recordation would not cover the sixth chapter and the security 
interest as to that chapter would be unperfected. There are other po-
tential situations in which a Copyright Office filing may not be appro-
priate to perfect a security interest. An author may feel that the work is 
of little value and does not require registration. A valid security inter-
est in unregistered works and works that are not specifically identified 
in the recorded documents may be created.8? However, the Copyright 
Act does not provide for valid perfection of these interests. 
In any such situation, it would be important to determine whether 
an Article Nine filing is effective. The result might differ depending on 
whether a state adopted the 1972 amendments to Article Nine. There-
fore each edition of Article Nine should be examined separately. Al-
though a financing statement is necessary to perfect a security interest 
in a general intangible such as a copyright,88 section 9-302(3) of the 
pre-1972 Article Nine provides, in pertinent part, "The filing provisions 
of this Article do not apply to a security interest in property subject to a 
statute (a) of the United States which provides for a national registra-
tion or filing of all security interests in such property .... "89 Under 
the new Copyright Act, there are security interests that cannot be per-
fected by recordation. Therefore, since the statute does not provide for 
a national registration of all copyright security interests, UCC section 
9-302 could be interpreted to require state recordation of all copyrights. 
But such an interpretation might be invalid in light of the preemption 
doctrine. The Copyright Act provides a clear statement that where at 
least one copyright transfer is recorded in the manner required to give 
constructive notice, that transfer has priority vis-A-vis later transfers.90 
Since that is clearly a national registration system, the UCC could be 
interpreted to mean that no grants of security interests in copyrights 
can be recorded in state files. A plausible interpretation of section 9-
302(3) is that the filing provisions of Article Nine do not apply to those 
copyrights for which a Copyright Act filing would be effective to per-
fect a security interest. However, where the copyright is not registered, 
a UCC filing could be effective.91 
87. Additionally, a business may own material that has copyright protection but 
which has been distributed so that it has been placed in the public domain by 
publication. See text accompanying note 31 supra. 
88. The VCC defines a general intangible as "any personal property (including things 
in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and 
money." V.c.c. § 9-106. Comment 1 expressly includes copyrights. Section 9-
302(1) lists the exceptions to the filing requirement; general intangibles are not 
excepted. 
89. V.e.e. § 9-302(3) (1962 version) (emphasis added). 
90. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. § 205(e) (Supp. IV 1980). 
91. This argument requires defining "such property" to mean registered copyrights 
but not unregistered copyrights. 
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Article Nine may be interpreted in such a way that, absent copy-
right registration, a state filing may be effective. Whether this approach 
conforms to the copyright law has not yet been addressed by any court. 
If it is recognized that once a copyright is registered the federal filing 
system must be exclusive, the new Copyright Act can be viewed as hav-
ing an anti-clutter provision which allows for two levels of copyright 
protection. The "federal" level is the more expensive and burdensome, 
requiring registration in the federal system. The "state" level is avail-
able only when the parties desire it. A security interest in a particular 
work which is unregistered or an unregistered addition to a work which 
is registered would be perfected by filing in the state system. Of course, 
the secured party would always take the risk that the copyright would 
be subsequently registered and that the later secured lender or pur-
chaser would record in the Copyright Office. But that is a risk the se-
cured party takes voluntarily and it is perfectly consistent with an 
Article Nine policy of placing the burden on the secured party to police 
the debtor.92 Moreover, such an interpretation of Article Nine and the 
Copyright Act would not compromise the statutory purpose of provid-
ing an artist a reasonable monopoly. It is true that reliance on state 
filing is risky, a risk that might translate into a lower value for the copy-
right. That risk, however, could be totally eliminated by registration 
and recordation in the Copyright Office. 
The 1972 revisions of Article Nine contain language which makes 
it more difficult to conclude that although a state filing is ineffective if 
there is a copyright registration, it is of at least questionable effective-
ness if there is no federal registration. The relevant language of the 
new section 9-302(3) reads: "The filing of a financing statement ... is 
not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property sub-
ject to (a) a statute or treaty of the United States which provides for a 
national. . . registration. . . or which specifies a place of filing differ-
ent from that specified in this Article .... "93 Certainly when there is a 
federal registration, an Article Nine filing is neither effective nor neces-
sary. However, the provision that a financing statement is not effective 
when a national registration is available or a place of filing is specified 
does not seem to leave open the possibility of an Article Nine filing 
even when there is no federal registration. It does not appear that any 
thought was given to the effect of this change with regard to copy-
rights.94 A strained interpretation of the new section 9-302(3)(a) which 
would effectuate state filing when there is no federal registration is as 
follows: when the particular copyright is unregistered, the national 
filing is unavailable and, therefore, there is no place of filing specified. 
92. See v.e.e. § 9-307. For example, one risk that a secured party takes is that the 
debtor will remove collateral from the state. 
93. /d. § 9-302(3)(a) (emphasis added). 
94. The change was made because of problems with state certificate of title laws. 
V.e.C. app. II § 9-302 reasons for 1972 change. 
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The term "registration" would need to be construed as referring only to 
property for which registration of all transfers of ownership are re-
quired. Since such transfers are not "registered" for copyrights but 
merely "recorded," the reference to registration is not relevant to copy-
right problems. Such an interpretation of section 9-302 is consistent 
with the section's probable purpose of avoiding state regulation when it 
is preempted. 
D. Foreclosure Procedure 
Although the Copyright Act recognizes the right to hypothecate a 
copyright, it provides no rule of procedure for the foreclosure of a se-
curity interest. Part five of Article Nine provides a law of foreclosure 
of security interests which is probably applicable to copyrights.95 In 
1952 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided 
that state courts, not federal courts, had jurisdiction over foreclosure 
proceedings.96 The court rejected the contention that since federal 
courts had jurisdiction of any action "arising under" the copyright stat-
ute,97 the federal courts must have jurisdiction over copyright foreclo-
sure. The decision is based on an analogy to patent law and a 
presumption of "restriction on federal jurisdiction in the absence of a 
clear grant," resulting from the limited jurisdiction of federal courtS.98 
The decision implies that foreclosure actions do not "arise under" the 
Copyright Act and that therefore state law controls.99 
There is a sounder basis on which to find that state law should 
apply: Congress recognizes security interests, so a fortiori there must be 
some procedure for foreclosure; this cannot be an area where Congress 
by silence meant there should be no rule. 100 The purpose of providing 
artists with a monopoly of reasonable duration would not be defeated 
95. U.e.e. §§ 9-501 to -5IS. 
96. Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952). 
97. Title 28, § 1338(a) of the United States Code provides, in pertinent part, that fed-
eral "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising 
under any Act of Congress relating to ... copyrights." 28 U.S.c. § 1338(a) 
(1976). 
9S. Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 197 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 
1952). See a/so Newman v. Crowell, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
99. The assumption throughout a discussion of foreclosure is that the agreement cre-
ating the security interest contains a power of sale. Otherwise, the secured party 
would need assistance in seizing the copyright, thus implicating a discussion of 
unsecured creditors' rights. See notes 112-50 and accompanying text i'!fra. Some 
security agreements neglect to include such a provision. See, e.g., Vol. 1796 U.S. 
Copyright Office Files, Security Agreement and Assignment of Copyrights by 
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 262 (1980). Other secured parties apparently acquire 
the power of sale by structuring the security agreement as an assignment of all 
rights to the lender with the borrower retaining rights to exploit the copyright. 
See, e.g., Vol. 1813 U.S. Copyright Office Files, Collateral Assignment of Rights 
of Orion Pictures Co. 23 (1980). 
100. Even when Congress is silent, the court may construe an intent to preempt any 
state legislation. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). 
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by following potentially non-uniform procedures in foreclosure. 101 
This is based on the fact that the details of the procedures of foreclo-
sure do not impact on the nature of the voluntary transaction into 
which the copyright owner and his lender enter. This is particularly 
true since the applicable state law gives the creditor the obligation of 
proceeding in a commercially reasonable manner. 102 
E Right to Terminate 
When a copyright is involved, secured creditors must be aware of 
the author's right to terminate a transfer. 103 Since the grant of a secur-
ity interest is considered to be a grant of a transfer,I04 the termination 
provision applies to security interests as well as outright sales. How-
ever, the underlying rationale of the termination provision, inability to 
predict the copyright's value years in advance,105 appears inapplicable 
to security interests. Upon sale of the debtor's property, secured parties 
are required to tum over to the debtor the amount received exceeding 
the amount of the outstanding debt. 106 Therefore, the copyright own-
er's inability to predict the copyright's value years in advance is irrele-
vant since he benefits from the increase in value. If the copyright has 
not substantially appreciated in value but there exists some reasonable 
possibility it might, the secured party should be just as reluctant as the 
author to sell it. 107 Presumably a secured lender can mitigate the 
harshness of the right to termination by specifying that the termination 
of transfer is an event of default. Since the right of termination does not 
arise for thirty-five years, it is doubtful that conventional secured lend-
ing transactions would be implicated. 
The right to terminate does raise some questions concerning secur-
ity interest foreclosure sales. Although providing that the author may 
terminate the transfer thirty-five years after the grant,108 the statute is 
ambiguous as to when the thirty-five years begins to run, I: e., from the 
date of the grant of the security interest or from the date of the foreclo-
sure sale. This is significant for two reasons. First, if the author does 
not exercise his right to terminate within the specified two- to ten-year 
period, he loses his right. 109 Second, the third party who purchases the 
101. Although Article Nine has been adopted in 49 states, it is conceivable that states 
might adopt variations which would make the procedure for foreclosure non-uni-
form. It is for this reason the text refers to those procedures as "potentially non-
uniform." 
102. V.e.e. § 9-504(3). 
103. See text accompanying notes 41, 43-48 supra. 
104. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.e. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980). 
105. See text accompanying note 46 supra. 
106. V.e.e. § 9-504(2). 
107. While, in the case of a public sale, the secured party could purchase the property 
being sold, V.e.e. § 9-504(3), the VCC requires that all aspects of the sale, in-
cluding the time, be "commercially reasonable." Id 
108. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.e. § 203(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). 
109. Id § 203(a)(4)(A). 
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copyright at a foreclosure sale must be able to determine the length of 
his ownership. Consider the situation where a copyright is granted as 
security in year one and a foreclosure sale takes place in year ten. Does 
the third party purchaser's absolute ownership rights extend for thirty-
five years or only twenty-five? Must the author give notice of termina-
tion in twenty-five to thirty-three years from the sale or fifteen to 
twenty-three years from the sale? 
Two arguments can be based on the statutory language to favor 
dating the right of termination to the date of the grant of the security 
interest. First, the only voluntary "grant" made by the author was the 
security agreement. Second, the original grant of the security interest 
includes within it an agreement to make a future grant, ie., the foreclo-
sure sale; the Copyright Act's provision preventing waiver of the au-
thor's termination right includes within it "an agreement. . . to make 
a future grant." I IO Thus, dating the termination right from the foreclo-
sure sale, as opposed to the original grant, would be contrary to the 
spirit of the anti-waiver provision. 
But the foreclosure sale could be deemed an independent grant 
since the author at that time does have the right to either satisfy the 
debt or participate in the sale. III Furthermore, the foreclosure sale 
often occurs at a time when the copyright is more fairly valued. Since 
the rationale for the termination provision is the difficulty of predicting 
the value of a literary work more than thirty-five years in advance, dat-
ing the termination right from the sale is therefore more appropriate. 
IV. UNSECURED CREDITORS 
If a debtor fails to voluntarily pay a creditor who has obtained a 
judgment, the judgment creditor is able to satisfy the judgment by sale 
of property of the debtor. The method and terminology for this proce-
dure vary from state to state. The basic procedure, however, is essen-
tially uniform. The judgment creditor obtains a writ directing an 
officer (usually called the sheriff) to execute on the judgment debtor's 
property. The officer then seizes and sells the property at an execution 
sale. 112 The issues which arise are whether copyright is a form of prop-
erty which is seizable under state law, whether such seizures have effect 
under the copyright laws, and whether the judgment creditor has prior-
ity vis-A-vis other claimants to the copyright. 
110. Id. § 203(a)(5). 
III. See u.c.c. § 9-506. 
112. The initial writ is variously called writ of execution, fieri facias, or attachment. 
The officer might be called a sheriff, constable or sergeant. There is also a supple-
mentary procedure which is an outgrowth of an equitable process initiated by a 
creditor's bill. The creditor's bill still survives in many states although it cannot be 
used if property can be otherwise reached. See Riesenfeld, Collection of Money 
Judgments in American Low--A Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. 
REV. 155 (1956-1957). 
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A. Amenability to Seizure Under State Law 
There is reason to doubt whether a copyright is a kind of property 
on which the executing officer may levy. Since at one time levy always 
involved an ~ctual seizure prior to sale, it is easy to understand why 
common law execution could not reach intangibles. I 13 Some in-
tangibles have become so identified with a writing that seizure of the 
paper itself has long constituted seizure of the obligation it memorial-
izes. Examples are a negotiable instrument, negotiable warehouse re-
ceipt or security.114 A copyright, however, is a pure intangible; the 
physical object which contains the copyrighted material and the copy-
righted material itself are distinct forms of property. Sale of the object 
does not constitute sale of the copyright. 115 Even possession of a certifi-
cate of copyright conveys no rights to the copyright. 116 Although at 
common law the writ of execution would not empower the sheriff to 
seize the copyright, recent statutes have expanded the reach of common 
law execution to include intangible properties. I 17 Conceivably, there-
fore, a copyright could be reached by this process. I IS 
Even in states where a copyright is theoretically available for 
seizure, the rules or statutes establishing the procedures for seizure 
often do not expressly provide for this type of property. I 19 This creates 
113. See Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1852). This is still true in at least 
one state. VA. CODE § 8.01-478 (1977). 
114. See, e.g., U.C.c. § 7-602 (warehouse receipt); id § 8-317 (securities). 
115. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 202 (Supp. IV 1980). Accord, Stephens v. 
Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1852) (sale of engraving at execution sale does not 
convey copyright); Kingsrow Enterprises, Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 
879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (execution sale of films and copyright certificates conveys no 
rights in copyrights). 
116. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 204(a) (Supp. IV 1980); see Kingsrow Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
117. See, e.g., CAL. ClV. FROC. CODE § 688(a) (West 1980) ("all goods, chattels, mon-
eys or other property"); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-305 (1980) ("any 
property or credit"). 
118. There may be some value in relegating copyright seizure to supplementary pro-
ceedings. See text accompanying notes 130-33 infra. Generally, other assets 
would have to be seized first and supplementary proceedings allow the court some 
discretion in selecting property to be seized. Although states have generally aban-
doned efforts to control the order of seizure, see, e.g., Steinhardt v. Russian Ortho-
dox Catholic Mut. Aid Soc'y, 366 Pa. 222, 77 A.2d 393 (1951), the philosophy 
underlying droit moral may support such an approach by courts in regard to 
copyrights. 
119. For example, Subtitle G of the Maryland Rules of Procedure provides for seizure 
of tangible personal property and garnishment of credits belonging to the debtor. 
Garnishment involves a mini-lawsuit against the party owing property or money 
to the judgment creditor. But copyright is a kind of intangible property for which 
there is no appropriate garnishee because no other person owes the property to the 
debtor. See also MD. R.P. G40-47. Pennsylvania provides for seizure of tangible 
personal property, partnership interests and other intangibles by serving a gar-
nishee. PA. R. 3108. It is clear that "intangibles" does not apply to copyrights. 
See P A. R. 3254, which contains the appropriate form. California provides only 
for the following types of property: "tangible personal property in the possession 
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an unfortunate gap. If the levying officer is given no procedure for 
seizing and selling the property, it is arguably of no value that the prop-
erty is theoretically amenable to execution. However, the lack of a spe-
cific statutory procedure for levying on a copyright should not be 
considered fatal. A law providing that "all property" is subject to levy 
implies that some procedure to enforce the law must be available. 120 
Conceptually there is no reason why copyrights could not be levied 
upon. Seizure no longer requires that the court actualJy take custody of 
the property. Even for tangible property, seizure often is no more than 
a symbolic act. 121 Levy is better considered functionally as a process 
which prevents, to the extent possible, deterioration or disposition of 
the asset and which gives fair notice of the judgment creditor's interest 
to other parties contemplating obtaining an interest in the property. 
For this reason, seizure of a debt is often accomplished merely by giv-
ing notice to the debtor.122 It is perfectly acceptable, then, to consider 
service on the debtor of a notice specifying which copyrights are being 
seized as an appropriate levy.123 At an ensuing sale, the officer would 
need only to give a receipt to the buyer. 124 
The flexibility and liberal statutory interpretation promoted by the 
foregoing argument is illustrated by a 1960 case decided by the Califor-
of the debtor" (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 688(c) (West 1980); "property or debt 
owed to the judgment debtor which is subject to execution but for which a method 
of levy or attachment is not provided" (id § 688(b»; negotiable instruments and 
securities (id § 487.01O(c»; tangible personal property in possession of third party 
(id § 487.330); and "choses in action" constituting debts in possession of a busi-
ness (id § 481.150). See also Peterson v. Sheriff of City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 115 Cal. 211, 46 P. 1060 (1896) (no method provided to execute on patent); 
Lowenberg v. Greenebaum, 99 Cal. 162, 33 P. 794 (1893) (no method to execute 
on seat on stock exchange). 
120. See McCray v. Chrucky, 68 N.J. Super. 533, 535, 173 A.2d 39, 40 (1961) ("The 
courts are enjoined to regard statutes [governing execution] as remedial in nature 
and to construe them liberally in favor of creditors and claimants."). 
121. Often the levying officer leaves the property in the hands of the debtor. See, e.g., 
MD. R.P. G46. It has been held that "[i]t is not essential that the [levying] officer 
make an actual seizure. If he have the goods in his view and power and note on 
the writ the fact of his levy thereon, this will in general suffice." Palais v. 
Dejarnette, 145 F.2d 953, 954 (4th Cir. 1944) (quoting BURKS PLEADING AND 
PRACTICE § 366, at 619 and construing Virginia law). 
122. Seizure of a debt or obligation needs to be distinguished from a garnishment in 
which the garnishee is required to pay money into the court. Seizure and sale of 
the debt at the execution sale would result in the debt being owed to the buyer. 
The buyer, of course, takes the risk that the debt will not be paid. See, e.g., CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 688(b) (West 1980). 
123. An analogous development is recent amendments to Article Eight of the UCC 
which permit the creation of "uncertificated security" in corporations. U.C.C. 
§ 8-102(b). An attachment or levy on such securities is accomplished "by legal 
process at the issuer's chief executive office in the United States." Id § 8-317(2). 
Possibly, when a copyright is registered, levy should require recording at the 
Copyright Office. In any event, when a copyright is registered the levy could not 
bind subsequent purchasers without such a filing. 
124. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 54 Cal. 2d 669, 671, 355 P.2d 481,483 (1960). 
424 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 11 
nia Supreme Court. 125 A creditor had obtained a writ of execution to 
levy upon the debtor's property, intangibles in the form of corporate 
stock. The writ was served upon a corporation from which the debtor 
had stock certificates. The sheriff purported to sell those shares at auc-
tion despite a statutory provision that the transfer of certificates was the 
exclusive means of transferring shares. 126 Although the court held that 
the corporation could not be compelled to issue new certificates to the 
purchaser, the court did give some effect to the sale. The court pointed 
out that the sheriffs sale did transfer "all the right, title and interest" of 
the debtor. 127 Therefore, the purchaser became substituted to all the 
debtor's rights, title and interest in the shares. Thus, the corporation 
could pay dividends to the buyer, and the buyer could vote. 128 Of 
course, if the debtor had sold the certificates to a good faith purchaser, 
the execution buyer would have lost his rightS. 129 But until then the 
execution buyer would have the right to locate the certificates and com-
pel the debtor to transfer them. 
The case is significant for two reasons. It distinguishes between 
the execution buyer's rights against the debtor and his rights against 
third parties, and it provides a method of reaching an asset of the 
debtor that is not clearly provided for by statute. Therefore, when state 
law provides that intangibles may be levied upon, notice from the sher-
iff to the debtor that a copyright is being seized should be considered 
sufficient even though not explicitly provided for by a statute. In the 
case of copyrights, when there is no certificate sirp.ilar to a stock certifi-
cate, recording of the transfer at the Copyright Office should be suffi-
cient to protect the creditor and execution buyer from claims of third 
parties. 
If state law does not allow execution on copyrights, a creditor un-
able to satisfy a judgment may utilize a state proceeding supplementary 
to execution. In such proceedings the creditor is entitled to compel the 
debtor to answer questions regarding the location or existence of the 
property.130 This may be of use in discovering copyrights or copyright-
able materials of which the creditor may not be aware, since a search of 
the copyright files in the Copyright Office under the name of the debtor 
would produce nothing unless the copyright is registered. 131 Apart 
from discovery, supplementary proceedings often permit the court to 
125. ReynOlds v. Reynolds, 54 Cal. 2d 669, 355 P.2d 481 (1960). 
126. The provision is similar to § 8-313(7)(a) of the UCc. The situation is more rele-
vant to copyrights since California had not adopted a provision requiring seizure 
of certificates for attachment or levy. 
127. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 54 Cal. 2d 669, 682, 355 P.2d 481, 489 (1960). See also 
MCAlvay v. Consumers' Salt Co., 112 Cal. App. 383, 297 P. 135 (1931). 
128. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 54 Cal. 2d 669, 682, 355 P.2d 481, 489 (1960). 
129. Id at 681, 355 P.2d at 488. 
130. See, e.g., MD. R.P. 628(a). 
131. As indicated in text accompanying note 29 supra, the debtor may not even be 
aware that a federal copyright has attached to some of his works. 
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order the debtor to relinquish property for sale in satisfaction of the 
judgment. 132 Finally, the statutes permit the court to appoint a receiver 
to administer the property of the debtor. Such a receiver could execute 
the grant necessary to sell the copyright. 133 
B. Amenability to Seizure Under Copyright Law 
It is necessary to examine the Copyright Act's provisions regulat-
ing transfers of own~rship to determine whether it sanctions the meth-
ods available to judgment creditors. Two sections are particularly 
relevant. Section 20l( d) enumerates the types of ownership transfers 
permitted, ie., any means of conveyance, operation of law, will, and 
intestate succession.134 Section 204(a) sets forth the appropriate meth-
ods of executing such transfers, "by operation of law" or a "memoran-
dum ... signed by the owner."135 
When a copyright owner is compelled by a court to execute a 
transfer for the benefit of a creditor, the involuntary character of the 
transaction should not invalidate the transfer. Such a transfer involves 
an instrument signed by the owner and is valid under the laws of the 
state in which it occurred. A court-ordered conveyance would, there-
fore, be valid under the Copyright Act. Similarly, when a court-ap-
pointed receiver executes the transfer, presumably the law recognizes 
the receiver as the owner and his signature as that of the owner.136 
Conversely, when there is a sale of a copyright upon which a court 
official has levied, there is no instrument signed by the owner. Never-
theless, in the absence of a signed instrument, section 204(a) of the 
Copyright Act does provide for transfers "by operation oflaw."137 Al-
though the statute and legislative history provide no guidance as to the 
meaning of "by operation of law," both bankruptcy proceedings and 
intestate succession were apparently contemplated.138 The validity of a 
132. See, e.g., MD. R.P. 628(d). 
133. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 568.5 (West 1980); MD. R.P. 628(d). See also Scad-
den Flat Gold Mining Co. v. Scadden, 121 Cal. 33, 53 P. 440 (1898) (proper for 
court to appoint receiver to take legal title and make conveyance); Olsan v. 
Comora, 73 Cal. App. 3d 642, 140 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1977) (receiver can be ap-
pointed to collect simple money judgment); Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic 
Fire Alarm Co., 151 Mass. 515, 24 N.E. 784 (1890) (master can assign patent); 
Gulf Mortgage & Realty Invs. v. Alten, 282 Pa. Super. 230, 422 A.2d 1090 (1980) 
(Court Rule 3118(6), stating court may grant relief deemed necessary, provides for 
compelling turnover of stock certificate). 
134. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 201(d)(I)-(4) (Supp. IV 1980). 
135. Id § 204(a). 
136. See Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126 (1882) (patent can be reached by creditor's bill, 
based on statutory language that conveyance can be executed by owner's "legal 
representative"); Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co., 151 Mass. 
515, 24 N.E.784 (1890) (master can assign patent). 
137. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 204 (Supp. IV 1980). 
138. Since the Copyright Act recognizes intestate succession to transfer ownership, id 
§ 201(d)(1), it is not consistent to read § 204(a), requiring a memorandum, to 
mean that such transfers are invalid. The language added to the involuntary 
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levy and sale of a copyright must also be based on the phrase "by oper-
ation of law." 
This result is supported by the use of the term "operation of law" 
in section 20l( d), which sets out the types of transfers permissible: 
namely by a conveyance, will, intestate succession, and "operation of 
law."139 Since the statute specifies the three other forms of transfer, 
"by operation of law" in section 204(a) must refer to an involuntary 
bankruptcy proceeding and judgment creditor levy. Presumably if 
"operation of law" referred only to the one extremely narrow class of 
transfers represented by involuntary bankruptcies, Congress would 
have so specified. 
The conclusion that the phrase "operation of law" in section 
204(a) should be construed to countenance a sheriffs seizure is further 
supported by reference to analogous situations involving the levy of 
other personal rights which are subject to government regulation re-
garding transfers of ownerships. These involve the levy of trucking and 
taxicab licenses issued by state and federal agencies. Modem courts 
have consistently upheld the sale of such licenses. 14O The cases do not 
make clear exactly how that levy is carried out. Presumably the certifi-
cate itself is seized although there is no pretense that the certificate is as 
closely identified with the intangible property rights as is a negotiable 
instrument or security. The seizure of the certificate, however, does 
serve to give the debtor notice and to limit his rights to dispose of the 
intangible. The courts often uphold these sales despite statutory lan-
guage stating the license is not property and may not be transferred 
without the approval of the issuing authority.141 The courts refuse to 
read statutory requirements for approval of transfers by a state board 
or commission to prevent execution sales. Rather, the courts merely 
hold that the purchase of a license at an execution sale is subject to 
such approval. 142 Similarly, sales of copyrights would require record-
transfer provision exempting bankruptcies from that provision indicates that 
transfers as a result of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings are also valid. See 
text accompanying note 147 infra. Therefore a transfer as a result of an involun-
tary bankruptcy must also be a transfer "by operation of law." 
139. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 201(d)(I) (Supp. IV 1980). 
140. See Barutha v. Prentice, 189 F.2d 29 (7th Cir.) (trucking license issued by state 
sold by bankruptcy trustee), urI. denied, 342 U.S. 841 (1951); Fidler v. United 
States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9507 (N.D.N.Y. 1972) (ICC Certificate of Pub-
lic Convenience properly levied upon and sold); Mirin v. Clark County Taxicab 
Auth., 90 Nev. 46, 518 P.2d 597 (taxi license properly levied upon and sold sub-
ject to Taxicab Authority approval), urI. denied, 419 U.S. 859 (1947); McCray v. 
Chrucky, 68 N.J. Super. 533, 173 A.2d 39 (1961) (taxi license properly levied upon 
in execution despite statutory restrictions against pledging or mortgaging license). 
141. See, e.g., Mirin v. Clark County Taxicab Auth., 90 Nev. 46, 49, 518 P.2d 597, 598, 
urI. denied, 419 U.S. 859 (1974); McCray v. Chrucky, 68 N.J. Super. 533, 536-37, 
173 A.2d 39, 40-41 (1961). The "property" language is present in statutes in an 
attempt to shield withdrawal or denial of the license from constitutional due pro-
cess scrutiny. 
142. E.g., McCray v. Chrucky, 68 N.J. Super. 533, 540, 173 A.2d 39, 43 (1961). 
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ing to be effective. 
Another area of recent judicial activity which demonstrates ame-
nability of statutorily created rights to execution process has involved 
seizure of stock in professional corporations. Often there are statutory 
provisions restricting the transferability of such shares to persons li-
censed in the profession. 143 Courts have held that these provisions re-
quire only that the purchaser of the shares be a licensed person or the 
corporation itself but that execution and sale by law to a judgment 
creditor is not prevented. 144 
Even though "by operation of law" can be liberally construed to 
include creditor seizure of copyrights, there is still one statutory barrier 
for the judgment creditor. That barrier is the involuntary transfer pro-
vision, section 20l( e) of the new Copyright Act. 145 At first blush, this 
provision prevents creditor seizure of copyrights to satisfy judg-
ments.146 The fact that Congress amended the section to exclude the 
bankruptcy laws from the prohibition supports the conclusion that, 
without the amendment, seizure as a result of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy would have been precluded. 147 Therefore, the involuntary 
seizure provision may restrict domestic governmental seizures. 148 
Only by ignoring the words of the statute and confining the invol-
untary seizure provision to its narrow purpose of preventing foreign 
governments from suppressing dissent could a court avoid the use of 
the provision to invalidate a creditor's seizure. 149 If, as argued, "opera-
143. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2911 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1982). 
144. Gulf Mortgage & Realty Invs. v. Alten, 282 Pa. Super. 230, 239, 422 A.2d 1090, 
1095 (1980). When the by-laws of the corporation prevented transfer of shares to 
non-licensed professionals, a bankruptcy court held that the shares should be 
treated as belonging to a professional who had lost his license and by state law 
was required to redeem them. In re Andrews, 14 Bankr. 356 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). 
In some states, the execution lien of seized property relates back to the date 
that the writ of execution is handed to the sheriff. Such a lien could not take 
priority over a later transferee who records in the Copyright Office. Cf. In re 
Cone, II Bankr. 925 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (execution lien on airplane could not relate 
back to defeat security interest perfected by filing with Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration). The proposal that levy of a copyright gives the creditor rights against the 
debtor, but not innocent third parties, is in line with Cone. 
145. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (Supp. IV 1980). The provision is set 
out in text accompanying note 50 supra. 
146. See 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 98. 
147. The last six words of the section, "except as provided under title II," were added 
on November 6, 1978, effective October I, 1979. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-598, § 313, 92 Stat. 2549, 2676 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (Supp. IV 1980». 
148. In reality, Congress does not seem to have considered the effect of the involuntary 
seizure section on the right of a judgment creditor to seize a copyright. The House 
Report states, "Traditional legal actions that may involve transfer of ownership, 
such as bankruptcy proceedings and mortgage foreclosures, are not within the 
scope of this subsection; the authors in such cases have voluntarily consented to 
these le~al processes .... " ~ouse ~eport, supra. note 3, at 57~9. Note that.the 
Report Ignores judgment creditors' seIZure, which IS also a tradltlonallegal action. 
149. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra for a discussion of the purpose of the 
involuntary seizure provision. 
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tion of law" does refer to creditor seizure and the involuntary seizure 
provision invalidates creditor seizure, the statute is inconsistent; it al-
lows a creditor's levy in one section and prohibits it in another. To 
avoid reading the statute inconsistently, courts should hold that the in-
voluntary seizure provision prevents only foreign governmental 
seizures designed to suppress dissent. 150 
The above argument assumes that most courts would limit the op-
eration of section 20l(e). That will not necessarily always be the case. 
Given compelling facts a court may consider an involuntary seizure of 
an author's work undesirable and, therefore, hold that the language 
prevents judgment creditors from selling copyrights. The involuntary 
seizure provision may thus be seen as a way of infusing droit moral 
principles into copyright law. 151 
V. GOVERNMENTAL LIENS 
In addition to secured and unsecured creditors generally, federal 
and state governmental units comprise a particularly favored class 
of creditors. Both the state and federal governments prescribe statutory 
liens which attach to debtor's property to secure unpaid taxes. The 
Federal Tax Lien Act l52 creates a lien on all property of a taxpayer 
who fails to pay after demand. 153 While a notice of tax lien must be 
filed in order for the federal government to have priority over most of 
the taxpayer's transferees,154 the Act provides that limited classes of 
purchasers and secured lenders can prevail even when there has been 
such a notice filed. 155 Since the Copyright Act also has a filing provi-
sion to record a creditor's interest in the copyright, there is a potential 
conflict between two federal statutes, the Tax Lien Act and the Copy-
right Act. 
According to the tax lien statute the notice is to be filed "in one 
office within the state ... , as designated by the laws of such State, in 
which the property ... is situated."156 The property is considered lo-
cated at the residence of the taxpayer. 157 If the state has not designated 
one office that meets the requirements of the law, the notice is filed in 
150. Since the involuntary seizure provision applies only when the author has not pre-
viously voluntarily transferred copyright, courts could also limit the scope of the 
provision by allowing seizure of all of the author's interest in the copyright when 
the author has transferred only a security interest in, or one of the exclusive rights 
under, the copyright. Each of these proposed results resolves an ambiguity in the 
statute in a way that would restrict considerably the effect of the provision on the 
grounds that a more liberal interpretation would not serve to further the purpose 
of that section. 
151. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra. 
152. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6326 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
153. Id § 6321 (1976). The lien relates back to the date of assessment. Id § 6322. 
154. Id § 6323(a) & (f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
155. Id § 6323(b)-(d) (1976). 
156. Id § 6323(f)(1). 
157. Id § 6323(f)(2). 
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the federal district court for the judicial district in which the property 
subject to the lien is located. The Copyright Act requires recordation 
in the Copyright Office. IS8 It is apparent that the states are caught in 
the crossfire between conflicting federal statutes. 
There are three possibilities to consider. State A specifies that tax 
liens against copyrights shall be filed at the Copyright Office. ls9 State 
D's statute provides that the tax liens for all personal property should 
be filed in a particular state office. 160 Finally, state C makes no appro-
priate provision and, therefore, filings would have to be made in the 
district court. 161 If the Copyright Act controls, a tax lien filing against a 
copyright must be made in the Copyright Office, even in states Band 
C If the Tax Lien Act controls, tax liens in state A must be filed in the 
district court since the state fails to meet the one office rule. 
There are no recorded decisions dealing with the conflicting filing 
requirements of the Tax Lien Act and the Copyright Act. Two analo-
gous cases involve conflicts between federal property registration sys-
tems and the Tax Lien Act. 162 However, those decisions offer little 
guidance as they lead to opposite conclusions. The first case involved a 
conflict between the Federal Aviation Administration Act and the Tax 
Lien Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that federal tax liens need not be filed with the Federal Aviation 
Administration 163 even though the relevant portion of the Federal Avi-
ation Administration Act 164 is similar to the priority provisions of the 
Copyright Act. 165 This would indicate that the Tax Lien Act controls. 
However, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas, in discussing a conflict between a tax lien and a lien filed in 
accordance with the federal Ship Mortgage Act, stated, "Maritime liens 
and proceedings are . . . 'of such a specialized nature' . . . Congress 
evidently intended that field of law (Maritime) to govern exclu-
sively."166 Since the Copyright Act is also a specialized provision, one 
could conclude that the Copyright Act should control. 
Resolution of the conflict requires consideration of the underlying 
158. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 205(a) (Supp. IV 1980). 
159. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, § 39B(1)(a) (West Supp. 1981). 
160. See, e.g., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-401(b) (1981). This is a slightly modi-
fied version of the language of the Uniform Federal Tax Lien Registration Act, 
7 A U.L.A. III (1978), and the Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act. Id at 16 
(Supp. 1982). 
161. See W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 62-66 (1972). 
162. See CIM Int'l v. United States, 641 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1980); Gulf Coast Marine 
Ways, Inc. v. The l.R. Hardee, 107 F. Supp. 379 (S.D. Tex. 1952). 
163. CIM Int'I v. United States, 641 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1980). This is based on a provi-
sion in Federal Aviation Administration regulations, "A notice of Federal tax lien 
is not recordable under this part, since it is required to be filed elsewhere by the 
Internal Revenue Code." 14 C.F.R. § 49.17(a) (1981). 
164. 49 U.S.c. § 1403 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
165. See text accompanying note 40 supra for the text of the statute. 
166. Gulf Coast Marine Ways, Inc. v. The l.R. Hardee, 107 F. Supp. 379, 385 (S.D. 
Tex. 1952). 
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rationale of both the tax lien and copyright statutes. The Tax Lien Act 
attempts to give the federal government the highest priority consciona-
ble in satisfying tax debts out of the taxpayer's property,,67 But even 
when a tax lien has been filed, some transfers of property survive. For 
example, it would be unreasonable to require searching a state filing 
system for such transfers as personal property purchased at retail or iIi 
certain casual sales. 168 The copyright statute can logically be read as 
another specific statutory exception to the priority of tax liens filed in 
state filing systems. To the extent that a purchaser cannot rely on the 
Copyright Office registration files, the value of a copyright decreases 
considerably. Therefore, giving priority to the Copyright Act is consis-
tent with the philosophy underlying both the tax lien and copyright 
systems by making an exception to the Tax Lien Act based on the rea-
sonable expectation of subsequent transferees. At the same time, there 
is no need to read the Copyright Act as prohibiting all use of state 
methods of perfecting transfers. 169 When a copyright is not registered 
and no transfers are recorded, a tax lien should be effective. 
Using the above analysis for states A, D and C: state A's statute 
requiring recording in the Copyright Office for tax liens is ineffective. 
The Copyright Act controls and in some cases it (not state tax lien stat-
utes) requires filing in the Copyright Office. When a tax lien filing 
could be effective without copyright filing, state A 's statute violates the 
one office rule. State D's statute requiring filing in a particular state 
office is effective to the extent it does not· conflict with the Copyright 
Act. In state C, a filing in the federal district court is effective to the 
extent it does not conflict with th~ Copyright Act. 
In addition to the federal tax liens, states also provide for tax liens 
which attach to personal property.170 Where the lien requires filing, 
that filing should be effective as to copyrights with the attendant risk 
that a later copyright filing will have priority. 
VI. BANKRUPTCY 
A bankruptcy case can be "commenced" by a voluntary petition 
filed by the debtor or by a petition filed by creditors of the debtor. 171 
The commencement of the case creates an "estate" which consists of 
"all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property." 172 Although 
the old Bankruptcy Act specified that the estate consisted of all "inter-
167. Even many state-created liens which arise prior to the tax lien are subordinated by 
use of the "choateness" doctrine. Liens are not specific as to lienor or amount of 
the lien, and property subject to the lien is inchoate. See United States v. Globe 
Corp., 113 Ariz. 44, 546 P.2d 11 (1976). 
168. See 1.R.c. § 6323(b)(2), (3) (1976). 
169. For a discussion of the use of state filing to perfect security interest in copyrights, 
see text accompanying notes 83-94 supra. 
170. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 322 (1980). 
171. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.c. §§ 301-303 (Supp. IV 1980). 
172. Id § 541(a)(1). 
1982) Creditors' Rights in Copyright Law 431 
ests in patents, patent rights, copyrights, and trademarks," 173 the cur-
rent language is more expansive and "includes all kinds of 
property." 174 
No filing in the copyright records is necessary by the bankruptcy 
trustee to perfect the estate's interest. The bankruptcy code provides 
that the trustee may avoid transfers of property that occur after the 
commencement of the case. 175 Although both the tax lien statute and 
the Copyright Act support a conclusion that the Copyright Act controls 
conflicts between the two, here the copyright provisions should not con-
trol. The Bankruptcy Act established a constitutionally provided for 
orderly procedure for all creditors to share all the property of the 
debtor.176 The Bankruptcy Act, unlike the Tax Lien Act, does not pro-
vide for classes of claimants to the property who do not take subject to 
the lien. 177 
When prior to the commencement of a bankruptcy case an author 
sells a copyright in exchange for a promise of royalty payments, the 
right to those payments is the property of the estate. But if the debtor is 
the owner of the copyright who has an obligation to pay royalties, the 
trustee may have the power to sell the copyright free of that obliga-
tion.178 The author would merely be a general creditor of the debtor. 
173. Id. § llO(a)(2) (1976) (repealed 1978). 
174. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 367-78, reprinted in [1978) U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 5787, 5868. 
175. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II u.s.c. § 549 (Supp. IV 1980). 
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
177. The only exceptions involve purchasers for value who take after an involuntary 
petition is filed, but before the bankruptcy court issues an order for relief, Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II U.S.c. § 549(b) (Supp. IV 1980), and some pur-
chasers of real property. Id. § 549(c). 
178. This would be analogous to a sale of goods on credit. If S sells goods to D on 
credit, S is merely a creditor of D's. In such a situation, S's right to reclaim the 
goods themselves is quite limited. See U.c.c. § 2-702 (seller may reclaim goods 
only within 10 days after buyer's receipt of goods if buyer is discovered insolvent; 
within 30 days if there has been a misrepresentation of solvency or intent to pay). 
S becomes a general, i.e., unsecured, creditor of D's. Gilmore, The Commercial 
Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1954). The author 
could improve his position only by retaining a security interest in the copyright as 
collateral for the royalty payment. Id. at 1060 n.7. See B&P Lumber Co. v. First 
Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 147 Ga. App. 762, 250 S.E.2d 505 (1978). Nevertheless, an 
author might advance three arguments against the trustee's right to the copyright 
free of the royalty obligation. The first is that despite the sale of the copyright, it 
is encumbered with an "equitable servitude." See In re Waterson, Berlin & Sny-
der Co., 48 F.2d 704, 710 (2d CiT. 1931). However, bankruptcy law generally 
prevents equitable liens from encumbering the trustee's title. 
Equitable liens were explicitly prohibited by the old Bankruptcy Act. Bank-
ruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 60(a)(6) (1976) (repealed 1978). That language, dealing 
specifically with preferential transfers, was not included in the Bankruptcy Code 
since the law of secured transactions was no longer ambiguous. Article Nine now 
makes clear that equitable liens are unperfected security interests. H.R. REP. No. 
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 209, reprinted in [1978) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
5963, 6170. See In re Washington Communications Group, Inc., 10 Bankr. 676 
(D.C. 1981). While the former section 60 dealt only with preferential transfers, 
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The author could only improve his position by retaining a security in-
terest in the copyright as collateral for the royalty payments. 179 
Since a copyright exists as soon as a work is fixed in tangible form, 
a person has a copyright in notes, diaries and manuscripts existing at 
the time the petition is filed. A professor's lecture notes may cause no 
problem. But if a professional author petitions for bankruptcy, any 
manuscripts ought to be listed on the bankruptcy petition. They could 
then be exempted from sale (possibly at minimal value). ISO Otherwise 
the debtor/author risks losing the bankruptcy discharge. lsl 
VII. LIMITATIONS ON THE VALUE OF COPYRIGHTS TO 
CREDITORS 
Judgment and foreclosure sales are notorious for bringing bargain 
the same policy supports disregarding equitable liens in other contexts. Waterson 
could similarly be explained by the unavailability of the means to retain a security 
interest in a copyright at that time. 
The author could also claim that the original grant contained an explicit or 
implied restriction on assignments. Such a restriction should not be enforceable 
in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II U.S.c. § 541(c) (Supp. IV 
1980). Finally, the author might argue that the transfer of the copyright was part 
of an "executory contract." Property rights of the debtor in such a contract are 
governed by section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code which might either prevent the 
trustee from assigning the contract at all, id. § 365(c), or require the trustee to cure 
past defaults and give adequate assurance of future performance. Id. 
§ 365(b)(I)(A), (t). The trustee could be prevented from assigning the contract on 
the grounds that it is a "personal service contract" unassignable without the per-
mission of the author. See In re P.H. McBride & Co., 132 F. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1904) 
(author had retained authority to approve future assignments, and the character 
and relations of the publisher in the Catholic book trade were material due to the 
nature of book). But see In re Howley-Dresser Co., 132 F. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1904). 
Moreover, an agreement whereby the debtor purchases a copyright in exchange 
for a promise of future royalty payments would probably not be considered an 
executory contract within the terms of the Bankruptcy Code. See Countryman, 
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: ParI/, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 451, 458, 460 
(1973) ("Executory contract" does not include contracts the performance of which 
is substantially completed by either the debtor or creditor, but only "a contract 
under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the con-
tract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance 
would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.") Pro-
fessor Countryman does argue that patent license agreements could be considered 
executory due to an implied warranty of validity. Id. at 501-02. But the case of 
an outright sale of a copyright is distinguishable, especially if warranties are ex-
plicitly excluded. 
179. Congress could afford authors relief if it so chooses. For example, consumers who 
make deposits in layaway transactions are given priority in distributions. Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II U.S.c. § 507(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). A purchaser of 
real property of the debtor is, in some instances, given a lien on the property for 
recovery of money paid towards the purchase of the property. Id. § 365(j). Con-
gress could, therefore, provide for a lien of some sort in the copyright. 
180. Id. § 522. 
181. See id. § 727(a)(I), (4). 
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prices for property.182 Several aspects of copyright and related law 
contribute to that phenomenon. One is the termination of transfers dis-
cussed above. 183 When a copyright is seized, the author may retain the 
right to terminate the transfer. The rationale for the non-waivable ter-
mination right, the difficulty of predicting the value of the copyright in 
thirty-five years, supports that result. That difficulty may explain why 
an author would resist selling the copyright to satisfy a judgment or 
debt. If the judgment or debt remains unsatisfied when the copyright 
transfer is terminated, the creditor could seize the copyright again. 184 
The language of the copyright statute may also be interpreted to 
prevent termination by the author. The statute speaks of a "grant," 
implying a voluntary transaction. But a sheriffs seizure is not a volun-
tary transaction; therefore, the termination clause would not apply. 
Moreover, if authors are thus prevented from terminating involuntary 
creditor sale transfers, presumably they would have incentive to seek 
profitable sales elsewhere, the proceeds of which would accrue to the 
benefit of the creditor. 
Finally, it)~ likely that courts would find an interpretation limiting 
the author's right to terminate more attractive. The inclusion by Con-
gress of the non-waivable right to terminate resulted from judicial hos-
tility to the nontransferability of the right of renewal. 18S Here again the 
termination provision of the statute limits the value of the author's as-
set to a purchaser. However, if after a creditor's sale the new owner of 
the copyright misuses the copyright or it dramatically increases in 
value, a court could easily dismiss the above reasoning favoring non-
termination and find the sale a terminable transfer: droit moral dressed 
up in right-to-termination' c1othes. 186 
Any execution purchaser takes the risk that there may be some 
lack of jurisdiction that would nullify the sale. 187 To the extent that a 
purchaser risks the sale's invalidation, the value (and hence the price) 
of the property decreases. While a conveyance executed by a receiver 
stands on firmer legal ground than an execution sale, there is neverthe-
less the risk that there might be a defect in the court's jurisdiction over 
the owner or that a receiver's act would be found in excess of the au-
thority granted by the court. Such defects would render the convey-
182. See Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 794 (1981) (collection of cases revealing prices obtained 
at judgment sales). 
183. See text accompanying notes 43-46 and 103-111 supra. 
184. The validity of this statement depends on state statutes of limitations on judg-
ments. In Maryland, by use of the writ of scire facias, a judgment can be kept 
alive indefinitely. See MD. R.P. 624. 
185. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra. There are no cases which discuss the 
effect of seizure of copyrights on th~ renewal right under the old Act. 
186. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra for a discussion of droit moral 
187. See Lincoln-Mercury-Phoenix, Inc. v. Base, 84 Ariz. 9,322 P.2d 891 (1958) (exe-
cution based on void judgment is void). Courts may also set aside a sheriffs sale 
when the price is grossly unfair. See, e.g., McCartney v. Frost, 282 Md. 631, 386 
A.2d 784 (1978). 
434 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 11 
ance void. 188 
Although a purchaser at an execution or foreclosure sale obtains 
all rights included within the copyright, the author retains a variety of 
state created rights which may serve to diminish the value of the copy-
right itself. Although the state created rights are often similar to copy-
rights, they do not appear to be preempted by the Copyright Act. For 
example, a "personality" may have a right of publicity. 189 Such a right 
is not seized along with the copyright. The purchaser of the copyright 
would not have the right to exploit. the personality of the author in 
selling the work. This limitation could affect the value of the copyright. 
Additionally, there may be a right of privacy which can be invaded by 
the public display of a person's work. 190 One state statute governs 
proper attribution of an author's work. 191 Unfair competition law may 
also be used to challenge profiting from the work of another or inaccu-
rately identifying the creator of a work. The right to those potential 
causes of action could not be seized by a creditor. The danger that 
exploitation of the work may subject the copyright purchaser to a suit 
for invasion of privacy or improper attribution also affects the value of 
the copyright. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although knotty problems arise in the interplay of the Copyright 
Act and creditor's rights law, consideration of the underlying purpose 
of the Copyright Act (limited monopoly to encourage creativity) can be 
helpful in their resolution. The Copyright Act can thereby be inter-
preted to allow for giving effect to state filings of transfers in some situ-
ations, and the U CC can be interpreted (or - if necessary - redrafted) 
to that effect. Similarly state lien law can be interpreted in relation to 
the Copyright Act to best effectuate the purposes of each. Finally we 
have seen that there are sufficient ambiguities to allow courts to infuse 
droit moral principles into Copyright law when courts believe that jus-
tice requires. 
188. See Nicholson v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 60 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. 
denied, 288 U.S. 605 (1933); McCutchen v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 5, 24 
P.2d 911 (1933). 
189. See Factors Etc. Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
190. See Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 991-
95 (1970). 
191. See Folett v. Arbor House Publishing Co., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 597, 602 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (construing N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976». 
